# Wiki Doc 5

## 1NC

### 1NC – FW – Info Reflexivity

#### Interpretation – affs must defend hypothetical enactment of a United States federal government policy that substantially increases prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases 64. [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or **determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”**.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law 4. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716]

Federal government. 1. A **national government** that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) **central government**. 2. **the U.S. government** – Also **termed national government**. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### ‘Core antitrust laws’ means Sherman, Clayton, and FTC

Phaffenroth 21 [Sonia Kuester Pfaffenroth, Partner, Arnold and Porter, focuses her practice on helping clients address complex antitrust issues in the US and globally. She rejoined the firm in 2017 from the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) where she served most recently as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil and Criminal Operations. In that role, Ms. Pfaffenroth was responsible for supervising both civil and criminal antitrust enforcement efforts, as well as the Division's work with antitrust and competition law enforcement agencies worldwide. Justin Hedge, Counsel, Arnold and Porter, and Monique N. Boyce, Sr. Associate, Arnold and Porter. “A Comparison Of Proposed Antitrust Legislation In 2021: Federal And New York State.” 7/2/21. https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/antitrust-eu-competition-/1086194/a-comparison-of-proposed-antitrust-legislation-in-2021-federal-and-new-york-state]

At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws "every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade," and Section 2 outlaws any "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize";1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices";2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

#### That’s key to predictability -- only an interp grounded in relevant legal literature gives debaters the basis to prepare negatives and affirmatives guaranteed to clash. There are a few impacts –

#### First is competitive equity – without predictable preparation and a stable stasis point, there is an aff side bias that destroys the competitive nature of the activity and participation – equity is obviously an impact because debate is a game that is key to the aff – if not, just vote neg

#### Second is information reflexivity --

#### The process of debate around a predictable governmental plan best creates the conditions for informed learning and well-rounded information gathering through a holistic research approach – the impact is information reflexivity – issues of factual evidence are difficult to resolve and require informed processes and information vetting to counter problematic premises that result in material violence like the Iraq war – only a model of debate that encourages 2nd and 3rd level argument testing, considers unintended consequences, and promotes conditional and dynamic argumentation will foster well informed decisions and self-efficacy

Leek 16. [Danielle R. Leek, Johns Hopkins University Advanced Academic Programs instructor, Director of Academic Innovation and Distance Education at Bunker Hill Community College, former executive director of the communications center and professor of communications at Grand Valley State University, “Policy debate pedagogy: a complementary strategy for civic and political engagement through service-learning,” Communication Education, 65:4, 401-405]

In policy debate, students are asked to consider whether a particular course of action should be taken, generally by state institutions such as the United States federal government, or its respective branches, such as the Supreme Court or the Congress (Snider & Schnurer, 2002). A policy debate can involve any institutional actor or agent such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and so on. Questions of policy can address broad global issues, such as “Should the United States federal government sign a new nuclear treaty with Iran?” Or they might consider narrow rules for legal action, such as“Should the Michigan Department of Treasury require individuals to pay taxes online?” When connected to a service-learning experience, educators might set aside time for students to debate a relevant policy question. Using previous examples, students working on the health campaign might also be asked to debate the question, “Should the City of Grand Rapids provide mobile health clinics in the downtown area?” Chemistry students could debate, “Should the federal government require a universal science curriculum in all high schools?” No matter the topic, students should have the opportunity to engage multiple perspectives on the question, including speaking on the affirmative to support a new policy and on the negative in opposition to a change in the status quo. Students may be asked to work with one or more partners to research and develop materials that can be used in their speeches or in question-and-answer periods related to their arguments.

Especially for readers familiar with extracurricular policy debate competitions in high schools or college, this depiction of what policy debate entails may seem overly simplistic. Yet, even basic consideration of policy issues related to a service-learning experience can improve a student’s odds of political learning. Through policy debate, students can develop information literacy and learn how to make critical arguments of fact. This experience is politically empowering for students who will also build confidence for political engagement.

Information literacy

While there are many definitions of information literacy, the term generally is understood to mean that a student is “able to recognize when information is needed, and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the information needed” for problem-solving and decision-making (Spitzer, Eisenberg, & Lowe, 1998, p. 19). Information exists in a variety of forms, in visual data, computer graphics, sound-recordings, film, and photographs. Information is also constructed and disseminated through a wide range of sources and mediums. Therefore, “information literacy” functions as a blanket term which covers a wide range of more specific literacies. Critiques of service-learning’s knowledge-building power, such as those articulated by Eby (1998) and Colby (2008), are challenging both the emphasis the pedagogy places on information gained through experience and the limited scope of political information students are exposed to in the process.

Policy debate can augment a student’s civic and political learning by fostering extended information literacies. Snider and Schnurer (2002) identify policy debate as an especially research intensive form of oral discussion which requires extensive time and commitment to learn the dimensions of a topic. Understanding policy issues calls for contemplating a range of materials, from traditional news media publications to court proceedings, research data, and institutional propaganda. Moreover, the nature of policy debate, which involves public presentation of arguments on two competing sides of a question, motivates students to go beyond basic information to achieve a more advanced level of expertise and credibility on a topic (Dybvig & Iverson, n.d.). This type of work differs from traditional research projects where students gather only the materials needed to support their argument while neglecting contrary evidence. Instead, the “debate research process encourages a kind of holistic approach, where students need to pay attention to the critics of their argument because they will have to respond to those attacks” (Snider & Schnurer, 2002, p. 32). In today’s attention economy, cultivating a sensibility for well-rounded information gathering can also aid students in recognizing when and how the knowledge produced in their social environments can be effectively translated to specific contexts. The “cultural shift in the production of data” which has followed the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies means that all students are likely “prosumers”—that is, they consume, produce, and coproduce information online all at the same time (Scoble, 2011).

Coupling service- learning with policy debate calls on students to apply information across registers of public engagement, including their own service efforts and their own public argumentation, in and outside of their debates. Information is used in the service experience, which in turn, informs the use of information in debates, where students then produce new information through their argumentation. The process is what Bruce (2008) refers to “informed learning,” or “using information in order to learn.” When individuals move from learning how to gather materials for a task to a cognitive awareness and understanding of how the information-seeking process shapes their learning, they are engaged in informed learning. Through this process, students can come to recognize that information management and credibility is deeply disciplinary and historically contextual (Bruce & Hughes, 2010). This understanding, combined with practical experience in locating information, is a critical missing element in contemporary political engagement. Over 20 years ago, Graber (1994) argued that one of the biggest obstacles to political engagement was not apathy, but a gap between the way news media presents information during elections, and the type of information voters need and will listen to during electoral campaigns. The challenge extends beyond elections into policy-making, especially as younger generations continue to revise their notions of citizenship away from institutional politics towards more social forms of activism (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). For students to effectively practice more expressive forms of citizenship they need experience managing the breadth of information available about issues they care about. As past research indicates a strong correlation between service-learning experience and the motivation and desire for post-graduation service, it seems likely that students who debate about policy issues related to service areas will continue their informed learning practices after they have left the classroom (Soria & Thomas-Card, 2014).

Arguing facts

In addition to building information literacies, students who combine policy debate with service-learning can practice “politically relevant skills,” which will help them have confidence for political engagement in the future. As Colby (2008) explains, this confidence should be tempered by tolerance for difference and differing opinions. On the surface, debating about institutional politics might seem counterintuitive to this goal. Politicians and the press have a credibility problem among college-aged students, and this leaves younger generations less inclined to feel obligated to the state or to look to traditional modes of policymaking for social change (Bennett et al., 2011; Manning & Edwards, 2014). This lack of faith in government and media outlets also makes political argument more difficult (Klumpp, 2006). Whereas these institutions once served as authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, the credibility of legislators and journalists has decreased over the last 40 years or so. Today, politicians and pundits are viewed as political actors interested in spectacle, power, and profit rather than truth-seeking or the common good.

While some political controversies are rooted in competing values, Klumpp (2006) explains that arguments about policy are more often based in fact. Indeed, when engaged in public arguments over questions of policy, people tend to “invoke the authority of facts to support their positions.” Likewise, “the governmental sphere has developed elaborate legal and deliberative processes in recognition of the power of facts as the basis for a decision.” Yet, while shared values are often quickly agreed upon, differences over fact are more difficult to resolve. Without credible institutions of authority that can disseminate facts, public deliberation requires more time, information-gathering, evaluation, and reasoning. The Bush administration’s decision to take military action in Iraq, for example, was presumably based on the “fact” that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction. This has now become a classic example of poor policy-making grounded in faulty factual evidence.

This shortcoming is precisely why policy debate is a valuable complement to servicelearning activities. Not only can students use their developing literacies to better understand social problems, they can also learn to access a broader range of knowledge sources, thereby mitigating the absence of fact-finding from traditional institutions. Furthermore, policy advocacy gives students experience testing the reasoning underlying claims of fact. Issues of source credibility, analogic comparisons, and data analysis are three examples of the type of critical thinking skills that students may need to apply in order to engage a question of policy (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). While the effect may be to undermine government action in some instances, in others students will gain a better understanding of when and where institutional activities can work to make change. As students gain knowledge about the relationship between institutional structures and the communities they serve, they grow confidence in their ability to engage in future conversations about policy issues. Zwarensteyn’s (2012) research highlights these sorts of effects in high school students who engage in competitive policy debate. Zwarensteyn theorizes that even minimal increases in technical knowledge about politics can translate to significant increases in a student’s sense of self-efficacy. Many students start off feeling very insecure when it comes to their mastery of institutional politics; policy debate helps overcome that insecurity. Moreover, because training in policy debate encourages students to address issues as arguments rather than partisan positions, it encourages them to engage policy-making without the hostility and incivility that often characterizes today’s political scene. Indeed, it is precisely that perceived hostility and incivility that prompts many young people to avoid politics in the first place.

I do not mean to imply that students who debate about their service-learning experiences will draw homogenous conclusions about policies. Quite the contrary. Students who engage in service-learning still bring their personal visions and history to bear on their debates. As a result, students will often have very different opinions after engaging in a shared debate experience. More importantly, the practice of debating should operate to particularize students’ knowledge of community partners and clients, working against the destructive generalizations and power dynamics that can result when students feel privileged to serve less fortunate “others.” For civic and political engagement through service-learning to be meaningful and productive, it must do more to challenge students’ concepts of the homogenous “we” who helps “them.” Seligman (2013) argues that this civic spirit can be cultivated through the core pedagogical principle of a “shared practice,” which emphasizes the application of knowledge to purpose (p. 60). Policy debate achieves this outcome by calling on students to consider and reconsider their understanding of themselves, institutions, community, and policy every time the question “should” may arise. As Seligman writes:

… the orientation of thought to purpose (having an explanation rest at a place, a purpose) is of extreme importance. We must recognize that the orientation of thought to purpose is to recognize moving from providing a knowledge of, to providing a knowledge for. This means that in the context of encountering difference it is not sufficient to learn about (have an idea of) the other, rather it means to have ideas for certain joint purposes—for a set of “to-does.” A purpose becomes the goal towards which our explanations should be oriented. (p. 61)

Put another way, policy debate challenges students “to maintain a sense of doubt and to carry on a systematic and protracted inquiry” in the process of service-learning itself (Seligman, 2013, p. 60). This is precisely the type of complex, ongoing, reflective inquiry that John Dewey had in mind.

Political engagement through policy debate

This essay began with a discussion of the growing attention to civic engagement programs in higher education. The national trend is to accomplish higher levels of student civic responsibility during and after their time in college through service-learning experiences tied to curricular learning objectives. A challenge for service-learning scholars and teachers is to recognize a distinction between civic activities that are accomplished by helping others and political activities that require engagement with the collective institutional structures and processes that govern social life. Both are necessary for democracy to thrive. Policy debate pedagogy can help service-learning educators accomplish these dual objectives.

To call policy debate a pedagogy rather than just a style of debate is purposeful. A pedagogy is a praxis for cultivating learning in others. The pedagogy of service-learning helps students to know and engage social conditions through physical engagement with their environments and communities. Policy debate pedagogy leads students to know and engage these same social conditions while also challenging them to apply their knowledge for the purpose of political advocacy. These pedagogies are natural compliments for cultivating student learning. Therefore, future studies should explore how well service-learning combined with policy debate can resolve concerns that policy debate alone does not go far enough to invest students with political agency (Mitchell, 1998). The present analysis suggests the potential for such an outcome is likely.

Moreover, research is clear that the civic effects of service-learning as an instructional method are improved simply by increasing the amount of time spent on in-class discussion about the service work students do (Levesque-Bristol, Knapp, & Fisher, 2010). Policy debates related to students’ service can accomplish this goal and more. Policy debates can also facilitate the political learning students need to build their political efficacy and capacity for political engagement. Through informed learning about the political process—especially in the context of service practice—students develop literacies that will extend beyond the classroom. Using this knowledge in reasoned public argument about policy challenges invites students to move beyond cynical disengagement towards a productive recognition of their own potential voice in the political world.

Policy debate pedagogy brings unique elements to the process of political learning. By emphasizing the conditional and dynamic nature of political arguments and processes, debates can work to relieve students of the misconception that there is a single “right answer” for questions about policy-making and politics, especially during election time. The communication perspective on policy debates also highlights students’ collective involvement in the ever-changing field of political terms, symbols, and meanings that constitute interpretations of our social world. In fact, the historical roots of the term “communication” seem to demand that speech and debate educators call for such emphasis on political learning. “To make common,” the Latin interpretation of communicare, situates our discipline as the heart of public political affairs (Peters, 1999). Connecting policy debate to service-learning helps highlight the common purpose of these approaches in efforts to promote civic engagement in higher education.

#### You should also filter their impacts through predictable testability and model comparison -- debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered -- a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

## Case

#### Subverting norms is worse – it presents a mirage of progress that conflates intellectual flattery with progressive politics

Ruti 15 [Mari, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*, Bloomsbury Publishing, pg. 180-184]

In Chapter 2, I pointed out that Butler's attempt to have it both ways—to denounce the Enlightenment while simultaneously using its resources—leads to conceptual contradictions that cannot easily be resolved. The matter is worth revisiting here in greater detail because it highlights my major disagreement with Butler, namely that her wholesale vilification of autonomy reaches the kinds of hyperbolic ideological heights that cannot be theoretically defended. Indeed, it is in part the predictability of Butler's stance on this issue that explains why I have been so critical of her in this book: that I always know ahead of time how the argument is going to go—autonomy, sovereignty, rationality, normative limits bad; antinormativity, no matter how far-fetched, good—makes me feel the same way I do when I am grading yet another graduate student paper that undertakes the task of "deconstructing" the humanist subject. In the latter instance, it takes all the pedagogical willpower I can conjure up to not write in the margin, "Didn't we already do this circa 1975?" In Butler's case, I suppose I would like some explanation for why the monotonous disparagement of autonomy and related concepts is so important to her.

"This question is worth asking because the problematic of the subject—the question of the proper way to theorize the relationship between autonomy and subjection, agency and abjection, accountability and social determination—has been one of the most divisive issues of contemporary theory. I have already outlined my own position, which is that either-or solutions to this problematic are too one-dimensional, that if human beings are not entirely autonomous, they are not entirely subjected either, which is why we need to theorize both poles of the dichotomy simultaneously. This, refreshingly, is what Allen tries to do, which is one reason I have found her arguments so convincing. Allen explains that her goal "is to offer an analysis of power in all its depth and complexity, including an analysis of subjection that explicates how power works at the intrasubjective level to shape and constitute our very subjectivity, and an account of autonomy that captures the constituted subject's capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation, its capacity to be self-constituting" (PS 2-3). Without an account of subjection, Allen adds, critical theory cannot grasp "the real-world relations of power and subordination along lines of gender, race, and sexuality that it must illuminate if it is to be truly critical"; but without a satisfactory account of autonomy, critical theory "cannot envision possible paths of social transformation" {PS 3). This is why it is important to understand how we can be constituted by power yet capable of constituting ourselves, how we can be limited by our social context yet capable of critical reflection and self-transformation beyond this context.

Undoubtedly even our capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation is socially constituted, so that it would be possible to posit—with Zizek—that this capacity merely renders our subordination more livable. In Zizek's skeptical reading (and this is a possibility I touched on in Chapter 4), what the system wants is precisely that we rebel against it—that we strive for the kind of self transformation that gives us the illusion of being able to distance ourselves from it—because, in the final analysis, our attempts to defy its power merely consolidate this power; as Zizek maintains, in one of his more Foucaultian moments, power thrives on our action of disidentification because it "can reproduce itself only through some form of self-distance, by relying on the obscene disavowed rules and practices that are in conflict with its public norms."2 Yet it is also the case—as Zizek himself repeatedly stresses—that without the capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation our relationship to the big Other would be one of utter subjection.

#### Bayer criticizes economics under-representing black and indigenous folks – they conclude that participating in economic forums and including scholarship from black and indigenous economists is necessary to resolve the disparity – that means the TVA solves best because it is in the forum of economics which they’ve metaphorized to be the topic

Bayer et al. 20 (Amanda Bayer; Professor of Economics @Swarthmore College, Gary A. Hoover; Professor of Economics @ University of Oklahoma, Ebonya Washington; Professor of Economics @ Yale College, “How You Can Work to Increase the Presence and Experience of Black, Latinx, and Native American People in the Economics Profession?”, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.3.193//af)

Welcome Broaden the Introductory Course **From the first contact that students have with economics, the field is off-putting**, respondents tell us. Some believe that the introductory courses are designed to “weed out” students from the major. Whether professors are doing this deliberately to decrease numbers or not, respondents point to theories and formulas devoid of applications as uninviting. The impact of these uninviting courses is not equal across student demographics. Bayer et al. (2020) find that minority (and women) students in introductory economics classes report significantly lower measures of relevance, belonging, and growth mindset; for example, they are less likely to agree that their professor uses relatable examples, to report feeling comfortable asking questions in class, to believe that people like them can become economists, and to believe that they could learn the material. Respondents recommend that introductory courses be more applied and that they include examples that are relevant to students from all backgrounds. In fact, nearly 75 percent of interview respondents cited an interest in public policy in explaining what first attracted them to economics. Says a recent undergraduate, Being able to connect what’s happened in the classroom with what a given student’s lived experience or question is, is extremely useful. . . . I personally know a lot of . . . people of color, who, I think personally, if economics was much more accessible, they would probably be economists because they’re interested in questions of, how do we fix the gender gap? How do we fix the racial disparities in education and wages? These are economics questions. A student who is now in an economics PhD program was hooked by being invited to critique the textbook models, Every time in class [the teacher] would say, “I’m going to show you this model[and] I want you to know that these are all of these assumptions baked into this model. . . . Every day you should ask yourself whether those assumptions are really true. . . .” And so, that got me thinking. . . . And I started realizing that I actually wasn’t that bad at math. I got to this point where I was like, oh wait, no, I’m proficient, I can probably do this. Another discouraging factor in one’s early years in economics is that, according to several respondents, professors give the impression that they are only interested in the top students. The same recent undergraduate advocating for more applied work above explained, “It’s like an ID card. Show your ID, show your A, ‘Okay, you get a letter. You get my attention.’ ” A respondent who graduated from college some time ago talked about how disheartening it was that he could not get a research assistant position on campus because all the positions had requirements for a minimum grade point average. Given that students come into college (and graduate school) with different prior academic experiences, have different rates and manners of assimilating information, and that there are types of intelligence invaluable to research that may not show up on an introductory microeconomics final, we do ourselves (and of course the students) a great disservice by eliminating them from consideration based solely on grades. Some students will come into an economics course (at the undergraduate or graduate level) with a strong network. Others will know no one and will therefore be at a disadvantage in completing coursework and studying for exams. Level the playing field by formalizing processes and taking across-the-board steps: share resources like copies of past exams universally, set up study groups for all students and encourage students to work collectively, and assign and guide graduate student advising. Students are receiving implicit and explicit messages about the identity of who belongs in the field. Counter those messages.6 Be upfront with students about the economics profession’s need to be more diverse and the messages of exclusion communicated by materials that omit or diminish the experience of minorities. Div.E.Q. at DiversifyingEcon.org (Bayer 2011) provides strategies for managing diverse classrooms. Call Out Bad Behavior The economics profession does not become more welcoming in graduate school and beyond. In fact, interview and survey respondents deemed it as “hostile,” “cutthroat,” and as previously stated, “elitist.” One associate professor describes her department’s treatment of graduate students as essentially their saying, “We’re going to pit you all against each other. We’re only going to support the top students. This is a fight to the death.”. . . The type of environment that’s in economics. I’m just going to be honest with you, I don’t think that a student who is an underrepresented student does well in that environment. I think that we tend to do well in a more supportive environment where we don’t feel so isolated. And about the profession in general, she continued, “The economics profession is brutal. Colleagues and students can be disrespectful, have implicit biases, and not understand the stress that being a minority economist entails.” There is a long history of economists from minority groups being pushed out, neglected, and undervalued. Examples include the experiences of Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander as the first African-American woman to receive a PhD in economics in 1921 (Malveaux 1991; Banks 2005) as well as the history of the National Economic Association (Simms and Wilson 2020) and the results of the recent AEA climate survey (Allgood et al. 2019). To create a more welcoming climate in economics for minority scholars, you can call out unacceptable behavior— racism, sexism, harassment of all types—when you see it and when it is reported to you. Your workplace (and our profession) needs clear policies and consequences for this behavior. The AEA Best Practice website (https://www.aeaweb.org/resources/best-practices) provides guidelines for developing such policies. More often than explicitly racist behavior, respondents had interactions that suggested more subtly expressed racial bias. The associate professor continues, [My white] colleagues or even other administrators, they don’t know that you have to deal with different layers. . . . I can say something, exactly the same as my white male colleague, but when I say it, I’m being a witch, or I’m mean, but they don’t deal with that. . . . So, I’m usually the first Black economist [my students have] ever seen. And that in and of itself has its own issues, like are you qualified? Are you competent? That’s what I mean is [my colleagues] don’t have to deal with [that] . . . and then when you do get eval[uation]s, . . . what [my chair] noticed was that when it comes to minorities, [the students] veer off [into] personality. He’s like, “I’ve never seen that with eval[uation]s of the white colleagues.”. . . They might like my class [but] they’d be like, “But I don’t like.” And it’s usually something really personal or how I dress. And he’s like, “I never see that with other colleagues unless they are . . . underrepresented minorities.” Other examples of this sort of subtle bias include differential treatment by colleagues, disrespectful interactions with supervisees or students, receiving more challenges and more interruptions from seminar audiences, and having one’s right to be in a certain job or location challenged. To make the economics environment more welcoming, you can raise awareness of the more subtle, but pervasive, biases too. Question whether evaluations, made by students or by colleagues, might be biased. Indeed, survey responses like ours along with the findings of large-scale studies led the AEA to recommend “Do not rely exclusively, or even primarily, on student evaluations of teaching to inform tenure and promotion decisions” (Bayer et al. 2019). Reduce the influence of remaining biases by standardizing processes such as job searches. Again, the AEA Best Practices website offers details (Bayer et al. 2019). Listen When asked what would improve diversity in the economics profession, an economist at a policy organization answered, I think people understanding that we are unique, and we all have different experiences. People being open to people talking about their experience and . . . actually hearing them. [I am] not saying that you have to agree with them. You don’t have to, that’s fine. But really listening to what people are saying that are from different backgrounds and saying like “Wow, I’ve never experienced that in my entire life but maybe that could be the case. And how can we talk about this?” And being more open about issues that minorities have. **Diversifying the profession means not just diversifying the hue of the skin of the people who do economics, but also diversifying the approaches, questions, experiences, and goals of economists**. Respondents asked to be heard on these differences, which shape both the substance of their work and their workplace experiences with implicit and explicit bias. Respondents also wanted to be heard by advisors whose help they would like in reaching research and career goals that are distinct from those of their advisors. For example, one PhD economist who is satisfied with her career in industry said, “If you’re in graduate school and you know you don’t want to be in academics, then there should be . . . someone telling you that’s okay; you don’t have to be an academic. You can go to industry.” Respondents want colleagues and department chairs to hear that service can be different for minority scholars, not only in terms of quantity of committees, but also in terms of intensity of the work. For example, minority faculty members frequently report more than their fair share of advisees, at least de facto, as minority students are eager to work with a minority advisor. Finally, respondents want to be heard in seminars and in other discussions of research including when they raise critiques through a racial lens, “Instead of being met with . . . not her again,” said a PhD student. The point is to listen actively to each individual’s particular concern, which may be quite distinct from yours, and then help to address it.7 Broaden the “Legitimate” Topics **More difficult than simply trying to raise certain ideas, respondents say, is trying to pursue them as research topics I think there’s a problem with this whole notion of . . . bringing new questions and new ways of approaching very established and old issues in economics.** People like to support, especially scholars of color, if they’re . . . echoing the mainstream and it’s harder and tougher when you’re not doing that. Respondents struggled to get the economics community to engage with work that was viewed as interdisciplinary in nature, was outside of the neoclassical paradigm, or that challenged economic dogma, among other topics. This played out for a current graduate student as follows, A lot of the research questions I had . . . as a first-year graduate student were kind of particular to my upbringing and the things that I experienced growing up and as a young adult. Early on, however, some faculty would always ask me to think about . . . my research questions’ value to other social scientists. This nudge led me to discard many of my initial motivations for pursuing a PhD, but at the time, I did not see this nudge as particularly evil. As I have reflected on this over the years, I realize that this nudge disproportionately affects minorities. **The social science community consists mostly of white males. . . . I’ll reiterate that these statements probably came from a good place. But in retrospect, faculty should avoid hindering potential research agendas because they are not interesting to white males**. Different backgrounds and lived experiences of course can lead to different research interests and insights (for example, Bayer and Rouse 2016; May, McGarvey, and Whaples 2014; Malmendier, Nagel, and Yan 2017). Respondents report that advisors and mentors particularly discourage graduate students and early stage minority researchers away from topics related to race or other aspects of their identity, which are the topics that in many cases drew the young researchers to economics in the first place. **There is a perception that Black scholars studying Black people or Latinx scholars studying Latinx people or Native American scholars studying Native American people may be biased or taken less seriously as scholars**. (Of course, this critique is never made of white men scholars studying white men.) Sadly, this double standard has not changed across the years. A full professor who earned her PhD several decades ago says that because of a nudge away from identity, her early work was “totally sexless and ethnicness-less” and it was 20 years before she began studying a topic that she enjoys and has been productive in, a topic related to her background. Many underrepresented minorities are drawn to economics research because they find the existing research to be problematic or lacking in some fashion.8 We imagine that advisors and mentors suggest against certain topics because they believe that conference organizers, journal editors, and hiring and tenure committees will not be appreciative of them. Thus, **the gatekeepers in the economics profession need to take a broader view of legitimate economics research**.

**\*\*\*HARVARD CARD ENDS\*\*\***

Engage, Admit, Hire, Promote

Respondents in our survey were unequivocal that having more peers, mentors, and role models of color would improve the economics experience for minorities. One graduate student said it would be “revolutionary.” Many underrepresentedminority students struggle with being the only “one” of their race, class, and/or academic background. Some students find it hard to connect across race. More frequently, respondents yearn to be in dialogue with other minority economists.

One respondent attended the AEA Summer Program and yet does not remember having a single instructor of color. Another expressed surprise: “Even though I went to college in [name of city], which has a very large minority population, I didn’t know any economists who were minorities on a basis where I could shoot ideas off of them or ask them what their story was, or how they got to where they needed to be.” Four Black women in the interview sample attribute their failure to go on to get their PhDs at least in part to the lack of mentors who look like them.

Role models can be on syllabi, not just in the classroom. You can increase exposure to the work of underrepresented-minority economists; as one example, social media can be a platform to lift up research by minorities. Diversify the literature you cite on syllabi and in research. Consider racial diversity in the seminars and conferences you organize (and as a tenured respondent to our survey added, not just on the race-related panels). A great new resource is the Diversifying Economics Seminars – Speakers List (https://econspeakerdiversity.shinyapps.io/ EconSpeakerDiversity/), which includes economists who identify as underrepresented minorities and/or women and/or LGBTQ+, along with their area of research and contact information.

#### Wholesale rejection of rationality and mastery is incoherent---debate, the ballot, and their argument all rely on those behaviors, and rejecting them ignores their strategic utility for emancipatory politics

Ruti 17(Mari, Professor of critical theory and of sexual diversity studies at the University of Toronto, “The Ethiscs of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects,” Page 155-156)

While I am at it, let me put some pressure on the wholesale rejection of reason that tends to characterize posthumanist theory, including some versions of queer theory. I am of course aware of the historical violences of Enlightenment reason, including its connection to Western imperialism’s “civilizing” mission. Furthermore, as a feminist, I am familiar with arguments regarding reason’s masculinist biases. And as a psychoanalytic thinker, I recognize the brutality of models of life that overvalue our rational agency at the expense of the body, the passions, the unconscious, and so on. I therefore agree that rationality is not the defining ingredient of human beings. Yet a blanket condemnation of reason seems both reductive and hypocritical—reductive because it discounts the considerable role that rationality plays in human life and hypocritical because it denies that, as academics, we rely on our rational capacities to stage our arguments.

Is it not the case that my ability to speak to you on these pages—and your capacity to process my arguments, critique them, and (hopefully) use them in your own thinking—is predicated on a degree of reason? Indeed, do we not spend much of our careers trying to reason with, and sometimes even outreason, each other? Furthermore, are we not usually trying (at least partially) to “master” something, such as the movement of thought, the organization of ideas, or the craft of writing? This may be idiosyncratic, but I spend a lot of time telling the graduate students whose dissertations I supervise that the organization of their ideas could use some work and that the syntax of their sentences (sometimes) sucks. And I spend even more time rereading my manuscripts in an attempt to make sure that my syntax does not (always) entirely suck. Perhaps this is why I find the unqualified rejection of both reason and mastery that has become habitual in contemporary progressive theory so absurd. True, none of us is fully rational. Nor can we ever fully master anything. Yes, my syntax still sometimes slips. But fortunately it is considerably better than it was when I was nineteen and barely spoke English. Have I tried to master the damn language? Hell yes.

It is in part for such banal reasons that I appreciate Amy Allen’s observation that there is an enormous difference between categorically rejecting reason on the one hand and trying to reenvision it along less tyrannical lines on the other. Referring to Huffer’s interpretation of Foucault in particular, Allen maintains that it is erroneous to assume—as Huffer does—that Foucault’s celebration of madness amounts to an attempt to do away with reason. According to Allen, Foucault undertook “neither a rejection of reason nor a romanticized idealization of unreason” (2013, 22). In other words, Foucault was not interested in destroying reason but rather in historicizing it by examining how it had been constructed at various points in time, how it had been shaped by disciplinary power, and how it had been deployed to meet specific socioeconomic and political goals.

There is no question that this project entailed a critique of the failings of Enlightenment reason. There is also no doubt that reason, for Foucault, was always impure (biased) in being socially contingent. This is why it must be diligently questioned, why we are right to ask how our dominant models of rationality have been implicated in various relations of power. But this does not mean that reason is altogether useless. For example, Allen observes that even though feminists have been at the forefront of criticizing the abuses of reason, they have frequently also found it enabling because it has allowed them to mount their intricate critiques of social hegemonies, including, somewhat ironically, reason’s patriarchal underpinnings. Furthermore, it is precisely the impurity of reason that opens up the possibility of alternative— less repressive, less objectionable—forms of reason. As Foucault explains, “If critical thought itself has a function . . . it is precisely to accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, and, at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers” (2000, 358). Reason, for Foucault, was always contaminated by its context but this, far from negating its value, was what made the reconceptualization of reason feasible in the first place.

#### Infrapolitics are a disaster and refusal fails– they assume a transformative potential from small moments of resistance that simply does not exist.

Reed 16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” *Nonsite*, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8

I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

#### Political engagement is crucial to indigenous soverieingty, progress, and survival – this is offense for contingency and disproves their theory of where power operates

Chavers 17 (6/9, Dr. Dean, director of Catching the Dream, a national scholarship program for Indian students, pHd from Stanford, “9 Laws and Programs Passed for Indians After the Occupation of Alcatraz”, <https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/9-laws-and-programs-passed-for-indians-after-the-occupation-of-alcatraz-bfO4irLCzkqrwO_rBtoFAA/>, Indian Country Today)

\*\*Edited for Ableist Language

Occupation set the stage for **positive Indian programs**

As of 1969, Congress had passed 5,000 laws for Indians. The effects of the laws had been to **reduce the role of Indian tribal leaders** and **enhance the power of federal officials** to regulate Indian people and their lives. The Indian occupation of Alcatraz Island in 1969 set the stage for the development of positive Indian programs. **We were against the “ations”—relocation and termination**.

Alcatraz led to the most enlightened Indian policy of the last 100 years. President Richard Nixon said in July 1970 that Indians should have no more termination and should have self-rule.

Ada Deer’s contributions to changing Indian policy may have been the most important of all the visionaries. She quit her job teaching and spent the next four years doing everything she could to persuade Congress to reverse the termination of her tribe, the Menominee. She slept on people’s couches. She bummed airline tickets to Indian meetings all over the country. She literally lived on charity for several years. But **she was determined to end termination for her tribe**, and she succeeded.

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Their termination had robbed them ~~blind.~~ (completely) They **did not have control over their own lands and timber holdings**, which the legislation from Congress had entrusted to some white bankers and business people in the local border towns. These people acted more like robber barons than they did trustees. Ada succeeded in getting **legislation through Congress that restored the tribe’s federal status**. Nixon signed the Menominee Restoration Act in 1973. It probably would not have passed without the Alcatraz occupation.

Ada served the first term as chairman of the restored tribe, and got their new constitution written, adopted, and approved. Then she went back to university teaching, only leaving to serve as President Clinton’s Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs from 1993 to 1997. She was a member of the steering committee for First Americans for Mondale in 1983-84, which I had initiated and chaired.

Among the many members of Congress who pushed positive Indian programs in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were Rep. Sydney Yates, Rep. Dale Kildee, Sen. Henry “Scoop” Jackson, Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Sen. Teddy Kennedy, and Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (Cheyenne). Ben was the only Indian in Congress during his six years in the House and his 12 years in the Senate. Among the new laws and programs that Congress has passed and the President has signed since 1970 are:

The Administration for Native Americans (ANA) was the old Office of Economic Opportunity Indian Desk**. In 1974** the **Congress passed** the Native American Programs **Act that authorized a much-expanded role** for the program. Its prior role had been **job training and employment**. Its role now is **promoting self-sufficiency and cultural preservation**. In recent years it has **added a program to preserve Native languages and another one to deal with environmental concerns.**

The Indian Health Service saw its budget more than doubled under Nixon between 1970 and 1975. The problem was that its budget had been below anemic. Its budget for FY 1970 was less than $107 million. The budget for FY 1975 was $235 million. The budget for FY 1976 was $4 billion.

The Health Care Improvement Act (P. L. 94-437) of 1976 aimed at improving urban Indian health and involving Indian people in the process. It includes a program of scholarships to Indians to study medicine, dentistry, psychiatry, nursing, and pharmacy. This **program has funded over 8,000 Indian students in critical health care fields.**

The Indian Health Service, which operates 180 Indian hospitals and clinics, still has a 35 percent vacancy rate for its professional positions. **The life expectancy of Indians has improved in the past 50 years from about 45 to over 60**, but it is still well below the national life expectancy rate of 75.

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Urban Indians suffered the worst. Few Indians could afford to drive from San Francisco to Pine Ridge for an infected tooth or an eye infection. So they suffered. Belva Cottier, the First Lady of Alcatraz, led the fight during the 1970s to establish urban Indian health clinics, with San Francisco being one of the first. The leaders of the urban Indian health movement first had to get a bill through Congress to fund the program, which was new. The feds now report that **150,000** Indians use the 34 urban Indian health clinics and that their health had deteriorated before they had health care available.

The Indian Education Act was passed by Congress in 1972. Sen. Robert F. Kennedy launched a national study of Indian education in 1968. His brother Teddy introduced a bill in 1969 to improve Indian education; after three years, the bill was finally passed in 1972. It **now provides funding to some 1,100 school districts for supplemental funding for Indian education.**

Despite the supplemental help, Indian education is still the worst in the nation, with a 50 percent high school dropout rate, test scores that are almost always below the 20th percentile, and the lowest rate of college attendance in the nation (only 17 percent, compared to 67 percent for the nation).

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Act of 1975 (P. L. 93-638) began the process of **bringing self-governance back** to Indian country. Sen. Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington sponsored this legislation. Prior to 638, tribes had little power and authority. Scoop sponsored one of the first termination bills in the 1940s, but by 1972 had reversed himself and became an advocate for self-determination. He needed Indian help when he ran for President in 1976.

Before 638**, it was the BIA that determined where Indian children went to school**, what leases on Indian land, timber, water, and minerals were contracted, how the payments to individual Indians of welfare and other monies were made, and other important matters**. The BIA ran things on the reservations, and the tribes just watched.** After 638, tribes could contract to operate these services themselves. **Everything from tribal government to tribal courts, jails, tribal enrollment, education, social services, and other functions could be included** in a 638 contract.

Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), P. L. 95-341, **in 1978.** After outlawing Indian religions for a century, and punishing Indians who practiced their religions, the federal government stopped suppressing and prosecuting Indian people for practicing their religion. Among the specific things **the government had outlawed were the Sun Dance, the Bear Dance, potlatches, give-aways, the use of peyote** in religious ceremonies, the use of sweat lodges, the use of **sacred sites, and the use of eagle feathers** in Indian religious ceremonies.

The BIA created the Bureau of Acknowledgement and Research (BAR)in 1978 in response to requests from tribes for reversal of the termination of their treaties, and in response to tribes seeking federal recognition for the first time. Without Congressional authorization, the BIA laid out the criteria for tribal recognition, and had it published in the Congressional Record,making the process official if not legal. One way to look at their actions is to view them as an attempt to stop terminated tribes from reversing their termination and to stop tribes that had never been recognized from gaining recognition.

In the next 20 years a total of 191 tribes and groups that claimed to be tribes applied for federal recognition. The BAR has never had Congressional authorization or approval, but it has assumed the power of life or death over recognizing Indian tribes. It laid out seven criteria that tribes had to meet to be federally recognized, even if they had been terminated.

Congress passed the Tribally Controlled Community College Act (TCCA) in 1978. It authorized the operation of community colleges on Indian reservations. The first tribally controlled college had been established at Navajo in 1968. Originally called Navajo Community College, it changed its name to Diné College two decades ago. Within a decade there were a handful of tribal colleges, and today there are 38 of them. They have made important contributions to Indian country, including an employment rate of graduates that **ranges between 85 and 90 percent**, compared to only 55 percent employment in Indian country overall.

Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (P. L. 95-608) in 1978 in response to a book edited by Steven Unger called The Destruction of American Indian Families. He documented that 25 to 35 percent of Indian children were taken away from Indian parents by non-Indians. They went to adopted homes, foster homes, and childcare institutions. This process started with the reservation system right after the Civil War, when the intention of the BIA and the missionaries was to destroy Indian tribes, Indian languages, and Indian cultures.

#### The field of economics is progressive---empirical basis in the field creates incentives to address inequality.

Harold Meyerson 21. Editor at large of The American Prospect. "The Berkeley School". American Prospect. 3-25-2021. https://prospect.org/economy/berkeley-school-economics/

Today, however, practical men—and women—ain’t what they used to be. Jerome Powell, the Trump-appointed chair of the Federal Reserve, says he’s more concerned about unemployment than he is about inflation—by the historic standards of the Fed, an act of high heresy. Congress just passed President Biden’s economic-rescue package, which does more for poor Americans than any program since it enacted Medicaid 56 years ago. Congress may yet enact a $15 minimum wage, while its most progressive members advocate a tax on wealth. The powers that be are not getting these ideas from dead economists, or from the mainstream American economists who have dominated the field between the 1970s and the past few years (though they remain a considerable force). They are getting these ideas from a group of labor and public-policy economists who’ve surged to the forefront of the profession over the past decade. And more than anyplace else, these economists are clustered at the University of California, Berkeley. Much of the work that shaped the groundbreaking child benefits in the $1.9 trillion stimulus bill, and directed those benefits for the first time to the genuinely poor, was done by Hilary Hoynes, a professor in both Berkeley’s economics department and its public-policy school. As Hoynes has documented in a series of studies, both the welfare reform of the 1990s and the reliance on tax credits to provide the child benefits largely, and perversely, excluded children in poverty. The benefits in the new stimulus bill are specifically targeted to include poor kids. As for scholarly work that made the case for the $15 minimum wage, the multiple studies produced over the past quarter-century by Michael Reich—like Hoynes, a Berkeley professor of both economics and public policy—have documented that the presumed downsides of mandating such a raise are largely fictitious. The senators who tried to persuade the Senate parliamentarian that the raise would have a positive effect on the federal budget over the next decade relied on Reich’s fiscal estimates that it would net an additional $65 billion to federal revenues. And the wealth tax? When Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders began advocating for it while on the presidential campaign trail in 2019, they based their advocacy on the research of two other Berkeley economists, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, whose studies had concluded that the wealthiest 0.1 percent of Americans held 19.3 percent of the nation’s wealth—three times what that group had held in 1979. Saez and Zucman also reported that the total tax rate for billionaires in 2018 was 23 percent; while for all taxpayers, it was 28 percent. Warren’s proposal, updated this February, called for a 2 percent tax on families with wealth exceeding $50 million, with an additional 1 percent surcharge on wealth exceeding $1 billion—which the Berkeley duo estimated would raise roughly $3 trillion over ten years. What, we may wonder, has been going on at Berkeley? In brief, a historic change. Over the past two decades, Berkeley’s economics department and associated institutes have been at the forefront of two critical changes in the practice of economics: a heightened emphasis on empirical research, and an increasing focus on inequality.

#### Empirical rigor and public policy in the field of Economics is key to targeting racial and gender inequality.

Harold Meyerson 21. Editor at large of The American Prospect. "The Berkeley School". American Prospect. 3-25-2021. https://prospect.org/economy/berkeley-school-economics/

BERKELEY HASN’T GONE it alone over the past three decades. Two Washington-based think tanks—the Economic Policy Institute and the Center for Economic Policy Research—have played key roles in studying our increasingly dysfunctional economy and developing policies to create more broadly shared prosperity. EPI, which was founded in 1986, has chiefly served as a tribune for the interests of American workers. In its long-running annual reports on The State of Working America and in a host of other papers, it has created some memorable explanations of the rise in inequality, including its graph charting the increases in productivity and income since the end of World War II (which rose in tandem until the 1970s, after which productivity continued to increase while median wages flatlined) and its yearly reports on the ratio of CEO pay to median worker pay. For its part, CEPR has highlighted a range of concerns, not least the several years of pre-2008-crash warnings from economist Dean Baker that the housing market had become a bubble that would soon and calamitously pop. Berkeley builds on one other valuable and unsung tradition. Beyond the rarified debates of freshwater versus saltwater economics in elite universities, a few heroic radical economics departments kept alive the tradition of historical inquiry and critique of market folly. At the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the New School in New York, and the University of California at Riverside, neo-Marxists and institutionalists created centers of scholarly dissent. Other schools, such as the Levy Institute at Bard College, were hospitable to the radicalism of Keynes, as opposed to watered down neo-Keynesianism. These critics proved prescient about the failure of markets and influenced the new mainstream at Berkeley and beyond. Heather Boushey, now on President Biden’s Council of Economic Advisers, has her Ph.D. from the New School. Within the circuit of Berkeley, Harvard, MIT, and Princeton, there are frequent migrations of professors and newly minted Ph.D.s. “I have eight former Ph.D. students now on the Berkeley faculty,” says Harvard’s Katz. Sometimes, the migrations flow west to east, as in the case of Harvard’s Raj Chetty, one of the discipline’s leading empirical economists on such topics as intergenerational mobility (or the lack thereof), who began such work at Berkeley and is now continuing it in Cambridge. That said, Berkeley sounds increasingly confident about its hard-won place in the economics ecosystem. “If you want to do labor economics, or public [policy] economics, you can make the case that Berkeley is the place to come,” says Rothstein. Ellora Derenoncourt, who was hired last year as an assistant professor both in the economics department and the Goldman School, says she came because Berkeley offered “a space to combine inequality studies with policy solutions.” Since she’s been on staff, she’s talked to a number of students who’d been admitted to several graduate economics programs at top-ranked schools and were deciding which to attend. For many, she says, “it’s the inequality issue that pushes them to come to Berkeley.” Increasingly, that issue isn’t seen as one simply of income, education, and class. “Economics has not been the discipline at the forefront of understanding racism,” Derenoncourt notes, and, indeed, economics departments have long been the whitest and most male of any of the social sciences. Not surprisingly, a growing number of professors and graduate students are now working on issues of racial and gender inequality, and the experience of immigrants as well. Nina Roussille is one of those students; she just completed her doctoral studies after five years at Berkeley and as an IRLE associate. Her dissertation used the database provided by Hired.com to research gender differences in salary, where she found that mid-career women generally ask for lower salaries than their male counterparts seeking the same jobs, as their networks tend to include more experienced women workers who’ve been accustomed to lower salaries than their male co-workers. At Berkeley, she says, the emphasis in choosing your dissertation topic is often on whether the topic could address a question in a way that could change the way people work, or the policies that shape their work. “It’s certainly not the case in departments across the nation,” she says, “but at Berkeley, everyone is trying to be on that frontier.” And that frontier may just be spreading. “Berkeley, Harvard, MIT, and Princeton are the leaders, but there’s a broad shift toward a more empirical focus,” says Harvard’s Katz. “You see it in young European economists. Even the young people at Chicago are using these methods.” Indeed, a paper issued this February confirms Katz’s assessment. Using “anonymized bank account data covering millions of households,” the paper examined whether the federally funded increase in unemployment insurance benefits during the pandemic actually discouraged the recipients of the more-generous-than-usual UI from seeking work, as the standard economic models predicted (and as West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin said he suspected). Instead, the authors wrote, while “simple job search models predict a sharp decline in search in the wake of a substantial benefit expansion … we instead find that the job-finding rate is quite stable.” In not discouraging job hunting and in boosting economic activity generally, they concluded, “benefit expansions during the pandemic were a more effective policy than predicted by standard structural models.” And the authors of this bit of empirically derived heresy? Three economists from the JPMorgan Chase Institute and three from the University of Chicago. And, the unkindest cut of all, the paper was published by Chicago’s Becker Friedman Institute, named after the university’s celebrated laissez-faire apostles Gary Becker and Milton Friedman. The age of Berkeley economics may just be getting started.

#### It turns the case.

Amanda 1AC Bayer et al. 20. Professor of Economics @Swarthmore College, Gary A. Hoover; Professor of Economics @ University of Oklahoma, Ebonya Washington; Professor of Economics @ Yale College, “How You Can Work to Increase the Presence and Experience of Black, Latinx, and Native American People in the Economics Profession?”, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.3.193

In fact, nearly 75 percent of interview respondents cited an interest in public policy in explaining what first attracted them to economics. Says a recent undergraduate, Being able to connect what’s happened in the classroom with what a given student’s lived experience or question is, is extremely useful. . . . I personally know a lot of . . . people of color, who, I think personally, if economics was much more accessible, they would probably be economists because they’re interested in questions of, how do we fix the gender gap? How do we fix the racial disparities in education and wages? These are economics questions. A student who is now in an economics PhD program was hooked by being invited to critique the textbook models, Every time in class [the teacher] would say, “I’m going to show you this model[and] I want you to know that these are all of these assumptions baked into this model. . . . Every day you should ask yourself whether those assumptions are really true. . . .” And so, that got me thinking. . . . And I started realizing that I actually wasn’t that bad at math. I got to this point where I was like, oh wait, no, I’m proficient, I can probably do this.

#### Economic rationality is valuable and self-correcting – none of their critiques apply to intellectual reforms in the field, but a wholesale rejection of economic study undermines the best tools for responding to social crises

**Ip 17** [Greg, Canadian-American journalist, currently the chief economics commentator for The Wall Street Journal. A native of Canada, Ip received a bachelor’s degree in economics and journalism from Carleton University in Ottawa, Ontario. “In Defense of the Dismal Science.” 8/25. https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-defense-of-the-dismal-science-1503679118]

Economists pride themselves on being the most scientific of social scientists. This leads them to reduce all human motives and behavior to quantifiable variables such as utility, welfare and income. But people are not by nature quantitative, and their motives often have no economic basis. Today’s most divisive issues, from fairness and inequality to national identity and culture, don’t have economic solutions.

Thus, when economists preach the virtues of globalization, market solutions or cost-benefit analysis, they sound to critics on the left like corporate shills lacking any moral anchor. To critics on the right, they sound like globalist elites who despise patriotism.

Yet it is precisely their love of numbers that makes economists invaluable. By stripping the emotions from pressing problems, economists can often illuminate the most practical ways to tackle them—but only if ordinary people and their representatives are prepared to listen.

Economics emerged in the 1700s as an offshoot of moral philosophy. Known then as political economy, its pioneering practitioners—such as David Hume and Adam Smith —believed that liberating individual self-interest, rather than following religious or political authority, maximized society’s well-being.

Smith made this case most memorably in “The Wealth of Nations” (1776), in which he famously invoked the benevolent “invisible hand” of the free market. But for today’s economists, David Ricardo’s “The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,” published in 1817, was even more of a breakthrough.

Most people aren’t surprised if a doctor, who could be a better caregiver to her children than a nanny, chooses instead to spend that time seeing patients and pays a nanny out of what she earns. Thanks to Ricardo, economists know that the same principle applies to countries. The average American worker can probably make more tires than a foreign worker, but his edge at producing grain is even greater—and thus the U.S. should export grain and import tires. This theory, known as “comparative advantage,” is both counterintuitive and powerful.

Ricardo went further, extolling the pacifying power of free trade: It “binds together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilized world,” he wrote. Most economists still agree that globalization fosters political stability and cooperation.

Non-economists have always found this emphasis on material interests and motives somewhat distasteful. In 1790, Edmund Burke, who was friends with Hume and Smith, wrote in “Reflections on the Revolution in France,” “The age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever.”

The influence of economists truly blossomed in the 20th century. The Great Depression gave birth to macroeconomics, the study of how consumption, investment, income and interest rates interact in the aggregate.

In search of better tools to manage the economy, the federal government commissioned economists in the 1930s to calculate gross national product. Convinced that the economy could no longer be left to its own devices, Congress passed the Employment Act in 1946, which established, among other things, a Council of Economic Advisers to provide the president with the necessary expert guidance.

The next year, Paul Samuelson’s seminal book, “Foundations of Economic Analysis,” used mathematics to formalize the key axioms of economics. He touched off a revolution that equipped economists with ever more powerful methods for explaining and analyzing economic behavior. They increasingly adopted the trappings of the physical sciences, hoping to achieve a similar degree of objective truth and predictive power.

Math did clarify economic thinking, but it didn’t improve its forecasting accuracy, which remains dreadful. Virtually no economists predicted the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the recession that followed. Nor has economics rid itself of bias. Economists who advise presidents and prime ministers routinely shape their analyses to validate particular political views.

In recent decades, the stature of economists has taken a beating from two critiques in particular. The first, popular especially on the left, argues that economists are slaves to the assumption that individuals act rationally and in their own best interests. These critics point to psychological and experimental evidence that shows how often people violate the axioms of Econ 101: Our spending and investment habits are often driven by emotions, rules of thumb, ignorance and shortsightedness. The financial crisis seemed to be the ultimate proof, as highly paid bankers and traders, armed with state-of-the-art economic techniques, took on so much risk that they nearly destroyed the global financial system.

The second critique originates from populist, nativist and nationalist movements in the world’s more prosperous countries. Economists consider national borders and sovereignty annoying obstacles to the free flow of goods, capital and people. The new movements of the right see them as essential preconditions for national identity and cohesion. Many Britons voted for Brexit because control over immigration and their laws mattered more to them than the pecuniary advantages of the European common market.

These trends have fed a broader mistrust of experts and elites. During last year’s election campaign, Mike Pence, Mr. Trump’s vice-presidential running mate, dismissed statistical evidence of the U.S. economy’s health by saying, “People in Fort Wayne, Indiana, know different.” In the months after Mr. Trump’s victory, his team wondered whether it should even appoint a chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. (The administration eventually nominated Kevin Hassett, a highly regarded economist from the conservative American Enterprise Institute.)

In Greece, economists aren’t simply mistrusted; they’re prosecuted. During the 2000s, Eurostat, the EU’s statistical arm, had repeatedly questioned the accuracy and political independence of Greek statistics. Soaring deficits in 2009 triggered a crisis and forced Greece to seek a bailout in 2010. Mr. Georgiou, a Greek native who received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and spent 21 years at the International Monetary Fund, took over Greece’s statistical agency that August. Officials had already shown previous debt and deficit figures to be understated. He revised them further upward and earned for his agency a clean bill of health from Eurostat.

Politicians of the left and right accused him of inflating Greece’s debts to justify its creditors’ demands for austerity. Prosecutors charged him with making false statements and improperly disseminating statistics without his board’s approval. Courts acquitted him, but the second set of charges was reinstated, resulting in this month’s conviction. Mr. Georgiou, who now lives in a suburb of Washington, D.C., plans to ask Greece’s supreme court for a retrial.

Mr. Georgiou says that his real offense, in the politicians’ eyes, was breaking from the past practice of “resisting” and “negotiating” with outsiders, such as the EU, over what official Greek data would show. The politicians needed a scapegoat to preserve their own “political narratives,” he says. He calls the implications of his case “terrifying” for other professionals responsible for economic statistics.

Economists bear some blame for the public and political backlash. Their disagreement with populist policies has often colored their predictions. British economists, including Mr. Carney, thought that Brexit would unleash so much uncertainty that markets and the economy would tank. American economists foresaw similar swoons if Mr. Trump became president. Both were wrong, at least thus far: Economies in both countries have chugged along, and stock markets in particular have soared. There may be long-term costs, of course, but those may be hard to detect.

But such misjudgments don’t justify the charges leveled at economists. Take, for example, their inability to predict financial meltdowns. Crises almost by definition are unpredictable. In a recent essay, Ricardo Reis, an economist at the London School of Economics, argues that failing to foretell a financial crash is no more an indictment of economics than failing to predict when a patient will die is an indictment of medicine. Economists didn’t predict the financial crisis, Prof. Reis notes, but they did help to arrest it by applying theory and experience: “The economy did not die, and a Great Depression was avoided, in no small part due to the advances of economics over many decades.”

Another caricature of economists is that they try to emulate physicists, fetishizing elegant, abstract mathematical models disconnected from economic reality. Paul Romer, the chief economist at the World Bank, derisively calls this approach “mathiness.” The critique is certainly fair in some corners of academia, but it is increasingly untrue of the profession as a whole.

In 1963, roughly half the papers published in the top three American economics journals were theoretical, according to a tally by Daniel Hamermesh, now at Royal Holloway, University of London. By 2011, that figure had shrunk to 28%; the remainder were empirical papers based on public data, on data gathered by the authors or on experiments. Economic debates these days are won not by the best theory but by the best data: Statistics are more important than calculus. Economists are far more obsessed with measurement than with math. When public discourse is plagued by innumeracy, this capacity to count is no small thing.

Economists are also instinctively skeptical of simple explanations. They are trained to look for equilibrium, which is another way of saying, “When you change one thing, how do other things respond? Where do things settle once all interactions have occurred?”

Advocates for a higher minimum wage extol the benefits to workers. Economists ask: Will it change employers’ demand for workers who earn the minimum wage? Or what they pay workers who earn just above the minimum? Or the prices they charge, or how much market share they lose to companies that don’t face the higher minimum or how much they invest in automation? Does it reduce turnover and thus make workers more productive?

Advocates of tariffs on imported steel focus on the benefit to domestic steelmakers and their workers. But economists ask: What happens to steel-consuming companies that now face higher prices, as well as to their workers and customers? Does penalizing imports boost the dollar and hurt U.S. exports?

The more data economists collect, the better they can map such complex interactions. Seemingly simple questions seldom have simple answers. A higher minimum wage helps workers in some circumstances but hurts them in others. Tariffs help some workers but hurt many others. Global warming will do some economic harm, but not enough to justify banning fossil fuels.

Sometimes, this attachment to numbers conveys a false precision. Critics say that the Congressional Budget Office overestimated how many people would get insurance under Obamacare and must therefore be overestimating how many will lose it if the law were to be replaced. But the CBO always warned that its estimates were highly uncertain; what no economists doubted, including those working in Mr. Trump’s administration, is that the number would be large. Economists could confidently predict that price controls would lead to shortages in Venezuela, though not how severe they would be.

Non-economists see all this as hopeless equivocation, but it is actually the way that evidence drives science. Economists still have their ideological leanings, but data has helped to restrict these biases. Surveys of top academic economists by the University of Chicago show considerable agreement, even among liberals and conservatives.

For example, the scholars almost all agree that fiscal stimulus reduced unemployment after the last recession and that trade with China benefits Americans by providing them with cheap goods. A study by Gordon Dahl and Roger Gordon of the University of California, San Diego, found that disagreement among economists was greatest where the empirical research was most sparse, as with the issue of whether natural-gas fracking helps U.S. exports.

Though economics remains an imperfect science, it has come a long way in 200 years. Its greatest challenge today isn’t the quality of the analysis it supplies, but whether there is still sufficient demand for it.

#### Affect can’t explain political or social life

Megan **Boler 18** and Elizabeth Davis, Department of Social Justice Education, OISE/University of Toronto, May 2018, “The affective politics of the “post-truth” era: Feeling rules and networked subjectivity,” Emotion, Space and Society Volume 27, Pages 75-85

While the attention to affective attunement is **potentially useful**, in deploying a definition of affect as quantitative, pre-personal, non-conscious, and non-signifying, one is left with **myriad questions** about how particular emotions are **targeted**, **produced** and **manipulated** within the affective politics of digital media. Papacharissi characterizes affective transmission as follows: “So digital, among other media, invite and transmit affect but also sustain affective feedback loops that generate and reproduce affective patterns of relating to others that are further reproduced as affect — that is, intensity that has not yet been cognitively processed as feeling, emotion, or thought” (23). Following the popular reification of affect, Papacharissi sharply distinguishes affect from emotion (2015, 13). “Affect explains the intensity with which something is experienced; it refers to just that: intensity” (2015, 135). For her, affect is a central component of how stories are formed and circulated within media flows, and affect helps provide an index of how some stories end up being salient in social media, and thus potentially have more or less political impact. While this account of affect resonates prima facie with Hochschild's concept of “deep stories” and felt truths which shape the feeling rules we see defining partisan polarization, readers are **left wanting a full articulation** of the **significance** (rather than simply the **alleged presence**) of affect as it circulates in and through digital media. This reflects a **more widespread tendency** in much scholarship to invoke “affect” in Massumi's “autonomous” sense with **little exploration** of the **complex relational manifestations** of emotions.

Affect **all too often** becomes a **mystified idea** akin to force or energy and intimates an **abstract celebration** of the uncontainable:

Disorder, marginality, and anarchy present the habitat for affect, mainly because order, mainstreaming, and hierarchy afford form that compromises the futurity of affect. Because marginal spaces support the emergence of change, affect is **inherently political**, although it **does not conform** to the structures we symbolically internalize as political. Thus, per affect theory, empowerment lies in liminality, in pre-emergence and emergence, or at the point at which new formations of the political are in the process of being imagined but **not yet articulated**. The form of affective power is pre-actualized, networked, and of a liquid nature.(2015, 19)

“Affect” so understood **pales in analytical resonance** or **utility** in contrast with earlier feminist analyses of emotion, which, as in the bitterness example above, describe the **actual shape** and **flow** of social life as it is intersubjectively produced in **specific micro-** and **macro-political contexts** of power relations. The qualitative descriptions of “affect” in social media are conceptually overshadowed by the language of emotion — and yet emotions are presented as simply what people “express”, not a web of intersubjectively produced sociality (see, e.g., Papacharissi, 2015, 15, 22, 53–54). As a result, the account is able **only to suggest broad quantitative measures** of the rate and flow of retweets as exemplifying affect.10 Affect understood as “intensity” **all too often** gestures at something it **does not explain**, while using rhetorical strategies that **further mystify the term**.

#### Academia isn’t a singular monolith – believing it is makes negative aspects inevitable and makes it impossible to engage in targeted, ethical resistance.

Heath et al. 13 – (2013, Mary Heath, Associate Professor at Flinders Law School, and Peter Burdon, Associate Professor at the Adelaide Law School, “Academic Resistance to the Neoliberal University,” 23 Legal Educ. Rev. 379, SSRN)

A Desirable Change and Ethical Resistance

Academics who identify as activists need a clear conception of who or what they are resisting. Put simply, not everything that occurs in universities is neoliberal or undesirable. The university consists of a complex assemblage of structures, values and practices. Like other social institutions, it has evolved over time with reference to the projects of individuals, political groups and other social institutions. Sometimes these forces are place-specific and sometimes they are national (or even international). Projects can also have lives of their own and are reproduced in unpredictable ways as they come together to constitute a particular institution.86 As the outcomes of our efforts and those of others become apparent, further critique and action may be called for, and our strategies and analyses of resistance may require revision.

For these reasons, we suggest that academic activists conceptualise the university as a set of practices that are historically contingent and capable of transformation. This perspective is important, first, because it brings into view the potential for alternatives to the prevailing state of legal education. In contrast, the construction of neoliberalism as ‘necessary and inevitable’ forestalls the possibility of resistance 87 and makes critique appear foolish.88 Second, it means that resistance can also be nuanced and directed at particular structures, practices or values rather than at the university or the tertiary system as a whole. This has obvious implications for the prospects of successful action and for our sense of agency as activists.

The flip side to this conceptualisation is also important. Desirable changes in legal education as well as in Australian universities have taken place during the last few decades as neoliberal practices have also become more and more embedded. As academic activists we need to choose forms of resistance that we believe are ethical and meaningful. We are in no way obliged to oppose every form of change. We might instead choose virtuous compliance with changes we think are desirable,89 or support goals we believe are desirable while opposing forms of implementation we believe are not.

#### Reps aren’t deterministic

Shim 14 [David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen. “Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing.”]

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them.

Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other.

However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

Yet, it should also be noted that visuals function as unquestioned referents in international politics when underlining the necessity of such specific policy practices as sanctions, deterrents and/or military cooperation. A good example of this is satellite imagery, which plays a pivotal role in the surveillance and assessment of missile or nuclear proliferation activities by so-called ‘rogue states’ like Iran and North Korea. Regarded as providing compelling evidence about the stage of development of nuclear facilities or about the collaboration between suspect states, satellite images point to a nexus between visuality, knowledge and international politics wherein this way of seeing consequently enables governments to make legitimate statements, draw conclusions and take informed political action. In sum, the visual provides the foundation for knowledge generation and, in doing so, bestows political responses with legitimacy (cf. Möller 2007). A now famous case-in-point is Colin Powell’s PowerPoint presentation at the United Nations Security Council in February 2003. In the briefing, the then US Secretary of State showed satellite images that allegedly proved the existence of Iraqi ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. What was remarkable about Powell’s presentation was that the visual emerged as the primary referent for the US government’s casus belli, which, in the words of MacDonald et al. (2010: 7–8), disclosed the fact that the ‘logic of geopolitical reason is now inseparable from its visual representation’ (see also, Campbell 2007c; Der Derian 2001).

The causal theory of the ‘CNN effect’, or what Perlmutter (1998: 1) has called above ‘visual determinism’, misconceives of how the visual recasts the political realm itself (Hansen 2011). Rather than asking whether an image caused an intervention, it should be asked instead how the visual has been involved in structuring the understandings of legitimate action, and how visual representations of different policy options affect particular security practices (Williams 2003: 527). For instance, many scholars have shown that images can provoke particularly emotive responses (Bleiker/Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2000; Hariman/Lucaites 2007; Mercer 2006; Ross 2006). Just one example of the (deliberate) evocation of an emotional reaction is the numerous fundraising campaigns that have been run by different humanitarian aid organizations over the years, in which imagery plays an essential role (Bell/Carens 2004; Dogra 2007; Manzo 2008).

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#### There are many TVA’s that prove antitrust laws can combat racial injustice—for example, expand the scope of the Clayton Act to consider racially disparate outcomes as anticompetitive effects or reverse SCOTUS rulings that vertical restraints were presumptively lawful under the Sherman Act

Kritter 21 [Dani Kritter, California Law Review, "Antitrust as Antiracist", March 2021, https://www.californialawreview.org/antitrust-as-antiracist/]

The federal antitrust laws—three statutes enacted over a century ago—are in the spotlight. The year 2020 brought a new reckoning with corporate power and a resurgent interest in using antitrust law as a force for populist change. The “hipster antitrust” movement argues that the focus of antitrust policy should not be limited to market power and consumer welfare. Rather, antitrust can and should be a remedy for a suite of societal ills, from workers’ rights to campaign finance and income inequality.

The year 2020 also marked an awakening to racial injustice in America. The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery sparked nationwide outrage and demands to reform institutions built on systemic racism. Yet the recent plans for antitrust reform—which primarily focus on monopolies in tech—ignore the fact that the antitrust status quo perpetuates racial injustice.

But it doesn’t have to be this way. This blog identifies consolidation in healthcare and vertical restraints in franchising as two examples of how lax antitrust enforcement has disproportionately harmed people of color. It also argues that by dusting off existing antitrust tools, antitrust enforcement can be antiracist.

Background: The Antitrust Toolbox

Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws to check the power of massive corporations run amuck. These laws—the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, and the Clayton Act—were originally designed to control corporate power, protect individual economic freedom, and ensure a fair and equal society.

But beginning in the 1970s when Robert Bork published the still-influential “Antitrust Paradox,” courts slowly narrowed the focus of antitrust law to protecting consumer welfare. Today, antitrust enforcement prioritizes preventing the anticompetitive acquisition, exercise, or maintenance of market power that threatens consumer welfare and competition—a much narrower goal than its populist origins.

Dusting Off the Tools

Recent years have seen bipartisan interest in reining in powerful corporations with more aggressive antitrust enforcement. One of the few agency voices calling for an antiracist approach to antitrust is Rebecca Slaughter, the acting chair of the FTC. Slaughter has recently spoken out about using antitrust enforcement to “right the wrongs of systemic racism.” She challenges what she views to be a faulty premise of antitrust law: “that antitrust can and should be value-neutral, and therefore social justice problems like racism do not have a role in antitrust enforcement.”

Slaughter argues that antitrust has never been and never will be value-neutral. Antitrust addresses market structures, and racism is entrenched in the historic and current market structures in the United States. When agencies make decisions about how to deploy antitrust tools, they can choose whether to reinforce these structural inequities or to dismantle them.

Healthcare and franchising are two examples of how a shift in antitrust enforcement from “value-neutral” to antiracist can break down market structures that perpetuate racial injustice.

Honing in on Healthcare Monopolies

Consolidation in the healthcare industry is a driving force behind the sky-high cost of medical care and pharmaceutical drugs. Due to a wave of healthcare mergers, most hospital markets in the United States are dominated by a single corporate entity. The lack of competition means the dominant hospital is free to exercise market power by raising prices and restricting output. Recent studies of prices for hospital and outpatient treatment report that healthcare mergers have resulted in large networks charging private insurers 2.5 to 3 times more than Medicare rates for the same patient care. These rising costs lead to higher insurance premiums paid by employers and individuals.

Artificially inflated healthcare costs disproportionately burden people of color and create a barrier to accessing quality care. Black families spend a greater share of their household income on health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs than the average American family. And of the thirty million uninsured individuals in the United States, half are people of color. The COVID-19 pandemic has put this health inequity in sharp focus: racial and ethnic minority groups are more likely to contract the virus, get severely ill, and die from coronavirus infections.

What can antitrust do? First, antitrust merger review can be antiracist. Mergers between competitors are scrutinized under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. When determining whether a merger lessens competition, the FTC, Department of Justice (DOJ), and courts consider the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. An antiracist application of the Clayton Act would consider racially disparate outcomes like health care costs, insurance premiums, and the quality of care provided as anticompetitive effects.

Business practices that perpetuate systemic racism are anticompetitive because they exclude people of color from full participation in the market. And this exclusion is expensive: a study by Citigroup estimates that discrimination cost the U.S. economy $16 trillion since 2000. Moreover, there is precedent for applying a broad conception of anticompetitive effects in merger review. In Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a meager 7.2 percent combined market share of two merging shoe manufacturers was unhealthy market concentration under the Clayton Act. Chief Justice Earl Warren acknowledged that concentration in the shoe industry might offer some efficiencies and lower prices for consumers, but “the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses” was a priority. Therefore, agencies can and should argue that mergers that reinforce racial inequity substantially lessen competition.

Second, antitrust enforcement actions can hone in on industries like healthcare where the anticompetitive effects are acutely felt by people of color. As California attorney general from 2011 to 2017, Vice President Kamala Harris prioritized taking on healthcare prices through antitrust. Her investigation laid the groundwork for California’s suit against Sutter Health for using its market power to raise prices and extort better deals from insurers, which resulted in a $575 million settlement. The DOJ and FTC should follow in California and Vice President Harris’s footsteps and crack down on healthcare, utilizing an antiracist approach.

Achieving Fairer Franchising

Franchising—a business form where a firm owning a brand outsources the delivery of goods or services to a separate firm or individual in exchange for a royalty off of gross sales—is a dominant mode of industrial organization in the United States. Because buying into a franchise bypasses the necessity of acquiring capital and working industry connections to get a business off the ground, economists have long lauded franchising as a straightforward path to economic independence. Franchising has become an important source of income and opportunity for minorities and immigrants. And in occupations like the restaurant industry, franchised businesses employ a significant share of workers of color.

Yet franchise contracts empower franchisors (the parent company) to hold franchisees (the individual business owners) and their employees in a vice-like grip. Under most franchise contracts, the parent company limits the franchisee’s ability to make decisions regarding prices, customers, and suppliers. Because the contract deprives franchisees of discretion over virtually every aspect of the business except for wages and hours, underpaying and overworking employees becomes the only way to maximize profits. Franchisors exacerbate this dynamic with “no-poach” clauses that prevent franchise operators from hiring employees of another operator within the same franchise business. No-poach clauses suppress wages because franchisees cannot compete for employees with better pay and working conditions.

At the same time that franchisors make it nearly impossible for franchisees and employees to prosper, they force franchisees to bear the risk if the venture fails. By using contract terms to reduce what franchisees can earn outside the franchise relationship relative to within it, parent companies induce their franchisees to work even harder than the value of the franchise contract warrants. Most franchise contracts include noncompete agreements, forum selection clauses that highly favor the franchisor, and a right of first refusal to any sale of the franchisee’s business. And most require franchisors to sign personal guarantees, which gives the franchisor a right to claim the franchisee’s personal assets in the event of bankruptcy or litigation.

Antitrust law labels these contractual limitations as “vertical restraints:” restrictions on competition agreed to by firms at different levels of the distribution process. Vertical restraints empower large corporations to control workers and reduce labor costs without taking on the traditional legal responsibilities for that control. And this control can be implemented on a discriminatory basis. In September 2020, fifty Black former franchisees sued McDonald’s for forcing them to operate in “economically depressed” communities and “dangerous locations” where profits were lower.

A shift in antitrust law is largely to blame for the proliferation of vertical restraints. Vertical restraints were once considered per se illegal restraints of trade under the Sherman Act. But in a series of decisions beginning with Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania in 1977 and culminating in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS in 1997, the Supreme Court held that vertical restraints were presumptively lawful and thus subject to a more searching and defendant-friendly rule of reason analysis. Since that shift, antitrust enforcement has largely stayed away from challenging restrictive franchise contracts.

An antiracist approach to antitrust would not shy away from challenging these exploitative business models. First, federal agencies could follow in the steps of states like Washington that investigated the use of restrictive no-poach clauses as per se illegal restraints of trade. The pressure created by Washington’s investigations led seven major fast-food chains to agree to end no-poach deals. An investigation by the FTC or DOJ into no-poach clauses and other anticompetitive vertical restraints common in franchising could have even more impact, given their national scope. Second, franchising demonstrates that antitrust reform should not narrowly focus on big tech monopolies. Instead, antitrust reform should include industries like franchising, where large corporations restrict the economic freedom of minority business owners and employees. Scrutinizing the use of vertical restraints in franchising is just as essential to preventing abuses of market power and would remedy a structural inequality that disproportionately harms people of color.

Conclusion

Antitrust enforcement is not a replacement for more aggressive reforms, and by nature can only address one transaction or firm at a time. Moreover, it is limited to fines rather than sweeping conduct remedies. But antitrust enforcement can put a dent in the structural problems driving the health care affordability crisis and the extortion of franchisees. And in doing so, it can leverage the power of the federal government to be actively race-conscious and to take actions to end racial inequities. Backed by the push to reform antitrust, the demands to dismantle structural racism, and a new Democratic administration, an antiracist approach to antitrust could dust off the toolbox and begin to dismantle the “value-neutral” antitrust status quo.

#### The irony of this is wild – the line that makes the claim says ‘“subordinate people experience the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control – what de Certeau calls “intextuation”’ which is literally not even a word – yellow is the reference

**Conquergood 2** (Dwight Conquergood “Performance Studies :Interventions and Radical Research” The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002 New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

In even stronger terms, Raymond Williams challenged the class-based arrogance of **scriptocentrism**, pointing to the “error” and “delusion” of “highly educated” people who are “so driven in on their reading” that “they **fail to notice** that there are other forms of skilled, intelligent, creative activity” such as “theatre” and “active politics.” This error “resembles that of the **narrow reformer** who supposes that farm labourers and village craftsmen were once uneducated, merely because they could not read.” He argued that “the contempt” for performance and practical activity, “which is always latent in the highly literate, is a mark of the observer’s limits, not those of the activities themselves” ([1958] 1983:309). Williams critiqued scholars for limiting their sources to written materials; I agree with Burke that scholarship is so skewed toward texts that even when researchers do attend to extralinguistic human action and embodied events they construe them as texts to be read. According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a **hallmark** of Western imperialism. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” (1984:161). Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often **inaccessible**, or threatening, charged with the regulatory powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy **as instruments of control** and displacement, e.g., green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders—what de Certeau calls “intextuation”: “Every power, including the power of law, is written  first of all on the backs of its subjects” (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the “undocumented” immigrants, the so-called “illegal aliens,” known in the vernacular as the people “sin papeles,” the people without papers, indocumentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble “the writing machine of the law” (de Certeau 1984:141). The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined. Transcription is not a transparent or politically innocent model for conceptualizing or engaging the world. The root metaphor of the text underpins the supremacy of Western knowledge systems by erasing the vast realm of human knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered, “a history of the **tacit** and the **habitual**” ( Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean Comaroff pay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors “both **verbally** and **nonverbally**” (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and struggle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that **exceeded** the verbal. The Comaroffs intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where “text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all” (1992:26). “In this day and age,” they ask, “do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage cannot speak at all? Or, under greater or lesser duress, opt not to do so” (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)? There are many ethnographic examples of how nonelite people recognize the **opacity of the text** and critique its dense occlusions and implications in historical processes of political economic privilege and systematic exclusion. *In Belize*, for example, Garifuna people, an African-descended minority group, use the word gapencillitin, which means “people with pencil,” to refer to middle- and upperclass members of the professional-managerial class, elites who approach life from an intellectual perspective. They use the word mapencillitin, literally “people without pencil,” to refer to rural and working-class people, “real folks” who approach life from a practitioner’s point of view.2 What is interesting about the Garifuna example is that class stratification, related to differential knowledges, is articulated in terms of access to literacy. The pencil draws the line between the haves and the have-nots. For Garifuna people, the pencil is not a neutral instrument; it functions metonymically as the operative technology of a complex political economy of knowledge, power, and the exclusions upon which privilege is based.

#### Their affirmation of linguistic indeterminacy and sovereignty challenges to the state feed the conservative playbook---their supposed transgressiveness gives neo-cons justification for unrestrained executive warmaking

**Passavant 10** - Associate Professor of Political Science Habart and William Smith College

(Paul, “Yoo's Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever,” Constellations, 17 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8675.2010.00614.x)

For some on the left, it has become conventional to celebrate, if not cultivate, pluralism, whether this means multiple forms of being or multiple interpretive possibilities with regard to texts. It has also become conventional to be critical of “sovereignty” and of “law.” Multiplicity is thought to be a threat to sovereignty, and this threat is thought to be democratizing or a force that resists oppression. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben exemplifies these tendencies within contemporary political and legal theory. In some of his earlier and less well-known work, he aspires toward a “coming community” that he calls “whatever being.” Whatever being embraces the infinite communicative possibilities of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions.∂ In his best-known work, Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps. He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being's positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication.∂ Whatever being is also being outside of law. If “law” persists in this “coming community,” it would be a “law” that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. “Law” will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had.∂ Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a less brutal world? The most conservative United States Supreme Court justices have recently embraced the fact that texts are open to multiple interpretations. For example, Samuel Alito has suggested that the meaning of public monuments is open to multiple interpretations that may shift over time to avoid a potential First Amendment establishment clause problem over a monument of the Ten Commandments in a public park.1 Yet, as the late Justice Blackmun has written regarding state endorsement of religion, “government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.”2 Recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations, as this instance shows, does not lead necessarily to outcomes friendly to democracy.∂ In this essay, I investigate how playing with the multiplicity of communicative possibilities can, contrary to Agamben's expectations, actually facilitate aspirations for unitary sovereign power. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations.∂ Those, like Agamben, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself rarely, if ever, have right-wing supporters of unchecked presidentialism in mind. Reading the scholarship and legal memoranda of John Yoo, formerly in the Bush administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and presently a University of California, Berkeley law professor, however, approaches an experience of pure mediality or of law that has become deposed or disconnected from its purposes. Yoo is well known as the author of the key legal memoranda asserting the president's discretionary power to make war, to engage in warrantless surveillance, and, most infamously, justifying torturous methods of interrogation. Some scholars refer to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland to describe the experience of reading Yoo's legal memos.3 Is John Yoo an exemplar of the whatever being and pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire?∂ In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality,as he indicates the experience of language itself as pure communicability or as pure means in his legal work when he emphasizes the openness of law to being exposed to new, different, flexible, or plural interpretive possibilities. I argue, however, that Yoo is not well described as whatever being. His work repeats too consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever.∂ Instead, Yoo's work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes as the emergence of whatever being. Without saying that there has been no resistance to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping and policies of torturous interrogations, the contrast between the response to the Nixon administration and the Bush administration is striking. Richard Nixon resigned one step ahead of impeachment in the midst of mass protests against his presidency. The articles of impeachment, for instance, addressed how Nixon engaged in warrantless wiretapping, and refused to execute laws passed by Congress faithfully while repeatedly engaging in conduct that violated the constitutional rights of citizens. Congress also passed major acts of legislation to prevent a president such as Nixon from ever again abusing power the way he had. These laws include the War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.∂ In contrast, almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed power to make war at the president's sole discretion. Additionally, upon learning that the Bush administration engaged in criminal acts of surveillance, Congress amended FISA in the summer of 2008 to expand the government's power to spy on Americans, while immunizing from legal accountability non-state actors who collaborated with the then-criminal acts of government officials who followed Bush's illegal orders. Congress tried to make it impossible for those detained to question, legally, their detention or to bring the torturous treatment they endured to a court's attention, while allowing the intelligence agencies to continue to engage in torturous acts by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). This complicity on the part of Congress cannot be explained on partisan grounds as many Democrats voted in favor of the MCA, and upon becoming the majority party in Congress, they have not rescinded it. Indeed, it was a Democratic-controlled Congress that brushed the Bush administration's illegal surveillance under the rug in 2008.4 Moreover, upon taking power in 2006, the Democratic leadership immediately stated that they would not pursue impeachment. Former Reagan administration Department of Justice lawyer Bruce Fein has decried the lack of outrage at the Bush administration's illegalities by suggesting that the nation has become a collection of constitutional “illiterates.”5 Perhaps law is being deposed as Agamben suggests.∂ Both Agamben's and Fein's observations may also indicate a failure of what Michel Foucault would call disciplinary power – the power to constitute subjects capable of exercising power, here the powers of liberal democracy – a failure that Gilles Deleuze has identified with the emergence of societies of control, and a subjective and ontological diversity that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the “multitude.”6 They also indicate practices of textual “interpretation” where interpretative acts extricate legal texts from the narratives that once oriented their purposes and animated these texts for a republican and anti-monarchical polity. Robert Cover argues, however, that law is part of a narrative practice constitutive of subjects and a way of life.7 Insofar as interpretive practices become extricated from the possibility of narrative, then, we may indeed doubt the continuing existence of “law,” as Agamben posits. Psychoanalytic theory also identifies a loss of a structuring meaning in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8∂ In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a variety of different theoretical and political perspectives are struggling to grasp and evaluate. While Agamben welcomes the failures of disciplinary powers as enabling the emergence of whatever being and the “coming community,” it is a cause for concern among those seeking to keep the faith with republicanism, with liberal democracy, or with a Constitution representing these aspirations. In this light, we can be more specific than Agamben about the kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty.

#### But USFG is accepted generally by society – least monoculture – here’s a dictionary definition and it’s proven by their lack of counter interp

Oxford Dictionary 22 [https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/federal-government]

federal government

/ˌfedərəl ˈɡʌvənmənt/

/ˌfedərəl ˈɡʌvərnmənt/

​(in the US) the system of government as defined in the Constitution which is based on the separation of powers among three branches: the executive branch, the legislative branch and the judicial branch. This system provides a series of checks and balances because each branch is able to limit the power of the others.

#### Debate does not change the fundamental values of its participants, but it does trend them away from over-reliance on their initial, unvetted gut reactions to symbolic politics in favor of more complex, deep understandings of issues – that takes out their link turn and magnifies the link

Niemeyer 11 [Simon Niemeyer, Centre for Deliberative Global Governance, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics. 2011. https://unige.ch/sciences-societe/socio/files/2114/0533/6108/002.pdf]

The results of the two case studies in this article suggest that deliberation does not fundamentally change individuals or inculcate a sense of moral duty. The particular values that prevailed in both issues were always present (and measurable), even if they were latent in expressed preferences. Before deliberation, most participants believed they were acting in the public interest,69 but good intentions alone are not sufficient to formulate civic-minded preferences. Predeliberative preferences were more strongly influenced by discourses associated with symbolic politics. Following deliberation, symbolic cues reduced the “cost” of arriving at a decision,70 but the cognitive shortcut resulted in positions that did not properly reflect participants’ overall subjectivity.

Before deliberation, symbolic politics—or at least the mere presence of potent symbols—distorted participants’ preferences. This process may be manipulative and overt, as in the case of the Bloomfield Track, or incidental, as in the case of the Fremantle Bridge. Deliberation successfully corrected the influence of symbolic politics because it provided both the incentive and the means to develop positions on an intersubjective set of recognized issues that extended beyond the narrow set of unhelpful symbolic ones. The mechanism whereby this occurred did not so much involve changing incentive structures, as predicted by institutional rational choice.71 Rather, it changed the decision pathway from a casual understanding of emotionally appealing content to a deeper understanding that allowed participants to better express their own subjectivity. The change was as much a function of stripping away the impact of symbolic arguments as it was due to participants’ increased ability and willingness to deal with issue complexity. This suggests that the transformative effect might be more easily replicated in the wider public sphere than is ordinarily

#### It’s about a Serbian video game – no context to the topic

Greenberg 12 (Greenberg, Jessica. Department of Anthropology at U of Illinois and Champaign-Urbana. Gaming The System: Semiotic Indeterminacy and Political Circulation in the New Age of Revolution. “Language and Communication.” dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lancom.2012.09.003 //shree)

Abstract

I compare the context-based discursive strategies of Otpor! - the Serbian student Resistance movement - as they unfolded in real-time, with the ways those strategies were represented through a widely circulating video game, A Force More Powerful, used to train activists in non-violent revolution. What made Otpor's discursive practices effective in Serbia was a semiotic indeterminacy that allowed activists to rally a broad and diverse coalition of citizens and politicians. This indeterminacy was difficult to translate within the procedural and causal logic of the game's programming and design. I argue that the logics encoded in the game circulated as a global pedagogy of non-violent revolution and democratization as much because of their specific pragmatic features as their powerful ideological and institutional backing.

#### Doesn’t matter that rev v rev debates are good– good teams are always going to find a way to disagree, but the balance will be skewed in a way that diminishes quality and incentives for focused research

#### Their revolutionary game fails because it removes constraints that make preparation and play much harder. The conclusion of Green says creative play within constraints is necessary to democratic, revolutionary pedagogy because it better addresses cause and effect logics. We are reading green

Greenberg 12 (Greenberg, Jessica. Department of Anthropology at U of Illinois and Champaign-Urbana. Gaming The System: Semiotic Indeterminacy and Political Circulation in the New Age of Revolution. “Language and Communication.” dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lancom.2012.09.003 //shree)

I consider the game itself as a particular kind of rhetorical object grounded in what Ian Bogost has termed procedural rhetoric: ‘‘the art of persuasion through rule-based representations and interactions rather than the spoken word, writing, images, or moving pictures (Bogost, 2007: ix).’’ In analyzing the procedural logics of the game, I track the political and social ideologies that the game communicates.2 What’s more, I show the ways in which particular ideologies of democracy at work in this artifact are inseparable from the way in which on-the-ground political practices come to be objectified and entextualized. By entextualization I mean the bounding and crystallization of a contextually embedded communicative process into a form that is considered to transcend its context. It is thus available for use in other social contexts, through repetition, citation, quotation, and evocation (Silverstein and Urban, 1996). Given that their ideological value stems from being apolitical, decontextualized and value-neutral, discourses of proceduralism and rule of law like those found in AFMP circulate more readily because their pragmatic features signal the authority of the supposedly universalizable institutional locations and practices through which they are constituted. Political and linguistic anthropologists have pointed to the ways in which discourses of democracy, human rights, and rule of law are authoritative because they reference principles that supposedly transcend, and in turn have the ability to reshape, local specificities and subjectivities (Hull, 2010; Goodale, 2009). Entire industries devoted to international democratization policy and scholarship further establish some models of democratic procedure as universally relevant based on value neutral, apolitical, and non-context-specific technical practices (Coles, 2007; Guilhot, 2005). Democratic proceduralist frameworks thus hold more weight because they carry the authority of their institutional conditions – and locations – of production. These locations are understood to be transparent, and the processes that produced them rational and universal in a way that transcends context. That these institutions are most often situated in the United States and Western Europe is no coincidence. Models of universal democratization are part of a long trajectory of making the particular social and economic arrangements of the ‘‘West’’ appear to be transcendent (Nugent, 2008; Trouillot, 2003; Chakrabarty, 2000). Such a project requires not only the existence of powerful institutional, military and economic forms of domination. It also requires textually and discursively mediated sites of interaction in which some forms of knowledge and practice are figured as place-less, as opposed to knowledge that is local and therefore partial. The links between decontextualized language and democratic rationality go back to the origins of liberalism exemplified by influential enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke. As Bauman and Briggs have demonstrated, Locke’s writings are marked by his attempts to elide all forms of intertextuality so as to link language to abstract, general terms and hence make it a more universal and accurate depiction of the world (Bauman and Briggs, 2000). The ‘‘capacity of discourse to both represent and regulate other discourses’’ within this democratic tradition is grounded in metadiscursive framings that denigrate specificity and context as at best irrelevant and at worst antithetical to liberal democratic thought and practice (Bauman and Briggs, 2000: 142). Domination of the particular within the liberal democratic tradition takes place in the first instance through specific pragmatic features of text (such as the elision of outside sources of textual authority) within metapragmatic frames that establish such elision as evidence of universality and transcendence. Democracy talk, from policy documents, handbooks, and hierarchally organized ratings charts index and entail a preexisting set of principles that position specific places in relation to placeless and timeless norms. Yet discourses of strategy and procedure in this complex of democratization ideologies and practices, of which AFMP is a part, are not only denotational features of political ideologies. The authority of such models is produced precisely through pragmatic features that elide the contextual conditions of their emergence. As such they are more easily circulated as text artifacts that lend themselves to authoritative, and seemingly seamless, objectification. In this case circulation is ideologized not as a process of translation of particular texts in contexts but as the unproblematic movement of universal ‘‘ideas’’ (Gal, 2003). In contrast, Otpor’s on-the-ground practices included semiotic forms and representational practices that operated through ambiguity and deep contextual cues. Sensational, affective, and embodied aspects of the movement were far less easy to translate into abstract tactical strategies within the game because their meaning stemmed from more indexically charged, contextually subtle pragmatic features that entailed specific contextual aspects of the Serbian scene. These included details like the way in which different protestors dressed, the use of particular kinds of music, double entendre and humor, the already existing significance of youth and students in the Serbian and socialist Yugoslav context. In comparing real-time communicative practices to their translation into a highly pedagogical, interactive virtual space, we see the often overlooked sites in which particular ideologies of democratic action and meaning circulate. In response to the often celebratory literature about the transformative and revolutionary capacities of new social media and communicative technologies it remains important to examine how the form of those media impact how certain ways of doing politics become taken-for-granted. It is worth asking whether and how these dynamics are different from the kinds of social mediation specific to other textual forms. On one hand, the circulation and consumption of mass mediated texts and semiotic objects is always bound up with their materiality (Shankar and Cavanaugh, 2012; Paz, 2009; Manning and Meneley, 2008; Keane, 2003). Games, like other textually-mediated forms, also invite reading (and playing) practices that produce corresponding modes of sociality (Cody, 2009). At the same time, the game offers a specific form of dynamic interaction that opens space for play and fantasy (Waskul, 2006; Fine, 1983). Dynamic games and virtual play allow for world-making precisely because they combine play with a bounded set of logics and vocabularies governing actions and interactions that allow for (and even demand) what Tom Boellstorff calls ‘‘intentional creativity’’ (Boellstorff, 2008: 25, see also Goffman, 1966). To this extent they are both like and unlike other kinds of texts, making games a particularly fruitful area to examine the dialectics of indeterminacy and systematicity and creativity and regimentation that have been so central to the study of text and context (Silverstein, 2003). More specifically, the game is a particularly striking example of the ideological work of entextualization practices because what makes it circulatable and transposable is a highly articulated relationship between formal structure and creative play coded into the game itself. It is precisely this relationship that forms the basis of the game’s democratic pedagogy by creating a model of cause and effect and situating agentive action within that world. In other words, the ‘‘meaning’’ of the game is inseparable from the particular ways in which it systematically encodes horizons of political possibility. These metadiscursive frames govern what makes for sensical forms of political meaning within the arc of play, making it particularly ‘‘shareable’’ across different, localized contexts (Urban, 1996).3 The goal and lesson of the game is not only to overthrow a dictator, but how to construct and represent meaning. As a discursive project, it teaches us to understand the world (and power relations within them) not through denotational meaning, but through a continual reenactment and modeling of entextualization practices themselves (Mertz, 1996).